Marilyn McCord Adams, CHRIST AND HORRORS: THE COHERENCE OF CHRISTOLOGY by Moser, Paul K.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 26 Issue 1 Article 7 
1-1-2009 
Adams, THE COHERENCE OF CHRISTOLOGY 
Paul K. Moser 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Moser, Paul K. (2009) "Adams, THE COHERENCE OF CHRISTOLOGY," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 26 : Iss. 1 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol26/iss1/7 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS
Christ and Horrors: The Coherence o f Christology, by Marilyn McCord Adams. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. ix + 331. 
$85 (cloth), $29.99 (paper).
PAUL K. MOSER, Loyola University of Chicago
This book is in the series Current Issues in Theology, which has as its main 
audience "upper-undergraduate and graduate students of theology, as 
well as . . . Christian teachers and church professionals." Perhaps this 
choice of audience explains why the book is rather long on historical pre­
sentation, particularly of medieval Latin theologians (the usual suspects, 
except for one Aelred of Rievaulx), and relatively short on conceptual and 
argumentative detail. The book's main idea is that a Chalcedonian Chris­
tology, which affirms the metaphysical thesis that Christ is one person but 
has a divine nature and a human nature (much like our human nature), 
yields a solution to the problem of horrendous evils.
The problem of horrendous evils is just the problem of "evils the partic­
ipation in (the doing or suffering of) which constitutes prima facie reason to 
doubt whether the participant's life could (given their inclusion in it) have 
positive meaning for him/her on the whole" (p. 32). Rape and torture are 
paradigm cases. Adams claims that "traditional free-will approaches— 
with their move to shift responsibility and/or blame for evil away from 
God and onto personal creatures—are stalemated by horrendous evil." 
The ground offered for this claim is: "Human radical vulnerability to hor­
rors cannot have its origin in misused created freedom, because—even if 
one accepted the story of Adam's fall as historical (which I do not)—the 
way it is told, humans were radically vulnerable to horrors from the be­
ginning, even in Eden" (p. 36).
Two considerations challenge Adams's portrait at the start. First, if "tra­
ditional free-will approaches" include Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense, 
which is the most rigorously developed free-will approach to date, then 
the charge of stalemate is misplaced. The free-will defense is not offered by 
Plantinga as a theodicy intended to explain or justify divine permission of 
evil, including horrendous evil. It is offered instead as a consistency argu­
ment against the charge of J. L. Mackie and others that theism is inconsistent 
with acknowledgement of the world's evil. Second, if vulnerability is suscep­
tibility, then a modal confusion threatens the portrait, given the distinction
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between human vulnerability to horrors and actual human (experienced) 
horrors. It is logically possible that humans are vulnerable to horrors but do 
not actually experience those horrors (say, because the horrors are not actu­
alized). So, the main problem is not in human vulnerability to horrors, but 
is rather in human experience of actual horrors. If one insists that human 
vulnerability to horrors is itself evil, then it is unclear that one can say that 
the creation of this world was good before the human fall (since Adam was 
vulnerable to evil before the fall), despite Adams's (not Adam's) suggestion 
to the contrary (p. 49). At least, much more explanation is needed here.
Divine love, according to many theologians and philosophers of reli­
gion, must allow for the real possibility of human rebellion if it is to allow 
for genuine human agency in relation to divine reality. Otherwise, human 
wills would be restricted in a way that blocks a kind of free agency needed 
for robust love in relationship with God. Even so, God's allowing for hu­
man rebellion and for horrifying human suffering does not underwrite 
Adams's talk (which sounds Calvinist) of "the horrors that God has per­
petrated on us" or of Jesus as "a perpetrator of horrors" (pp. 41, 71; cf. p. 
274). God's allowing for human susceptibility to horrors is one thing, and it 
is arguably required by robust love in divine-human relationships; God's 
"perpetrating" horrors on humans would be something else, and it would 
at least suggest that God causes evil and thus falls short of moral perfec­
tion and worthiness of worship. Horrors, recall, are "evils," and moral 
perfection does not allow one (even God) to do evil that good may come. 
Many readers will remain puzzled at this point.
Adams offers the Chalcedonian Christ as the God-man who supplies 
three stages of horror-defeat. In her words:
(1) What Divine horror-participation does is to turn merely human 
horror-participation into occasions of personal intimacy with God. I 
call this Stage-I horror-defeat . . . . (2) Because we are developmen­
tal creatures whose meaning-making capacities are easily damaged 
and distorted in a material world such as this, because horrors at 
best stump and at worst shatter our abilities to make positive sense 
out of our lives, our meaning-making capacities require healing and 
coaching. I call this Stage-II horror-defeat. (3) Finally, the plot cannot 
really resolve into a happy ending unless the relation of embodied 
persons to our material environment is renegotiated so that we are 
no longer radically vulnerable to horrors. I call this Stage-III horror- 
defeat. (pp. 47-48)
Adams denies that human powers are adequate to defeat horrors and re­
store a person after participation in horrors. Divine power is needed.
Enter the Chalcedonian Christ. According to Adams: "Christ effects 
Stage-I horror defeat primarily through what He does and suffers in His 
human nature. Christ effects Stage-II and Stage-III horror-defeat primarily 
through His Divine nature but manifests them in His human nature" (p. 
167). One big question is, of course: How? Part of the answer offered is:
Christ is the One in Whom God's friendliness towards the human 
race is integrated. Christ is the One Who shares our human nature.
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It is within the framework of His human personality that God es­
pecially befriends the whole human race, not least by sharing both 
our vulnerability to and our actual participation in horrors. Christ 
befriends us in a more intimate way through His Divine nature, 
through psychological-sense personal omnipresence and functional 
collaboration: I-not-I-but Christ. "What a friend we have in Jesus!" 
(pp. 167-168).
This line of explanation concludes with a long list of quotations from Julian 
of Norwich on "Mother Jesus" as "the one in Whom God's mothering func­
tions are united" (pp. 168-169).
The key assumption is that the participation of the God-Man in hu­
man horrors can defeat the power of those horrors to rob a life of positive 
meaning. The corresponding proposal is evidently that the offered friend­
ship with God (and all this eventually involves, including bodily resur­
rection) can make human life worthwhile, horrors notwithstanding. This 
approach is not offered as a theodicy, "because God has no obligations to 
creatures and hence no need to justify Divine actions to us." The ultimate 
ground offered is: "Personal though God is, the metaphysical size-gap is 
too big for God to be drawn down into the network of rights and obliga­
tions that bind together merely human beings" (p. 43). Adams's God thus 
emerges as a God beyond moral obligation toward humans, even though 
it's altogether unclear why we should think that "the metaphysical size- 
gap" (is that a power gap?) between God and human entails a relevant 
difference concerning moral obligations.
At this point we lose any moral grip on what Adams means by the 
preeminent title "God." The best way to understand the idea of the God 
and Father of Jesus is, in keeping with the Sermon on the Mount, as the 
one God worthy of worship in virtue of moral perfection, the same perfec­
tion required of followers of Jesus in virtue of required enemy-love (Matt. 
5:43-48). If God is not morally obligated to love God's enemies (as the 
followers of Jesus are obligated, according to the Sermon on the Mount), 
then this God is not the God and Father of Jesus, and (in addition) is not 
morally perfect or worthy of worship. In short, this God is not the true, 
worship-worthy God manifested by Jesus. In offering a God beyond mor­
al obligation toward humans, Adams offers a God unworthy of the title 
"God," which, properly understood, connotes worthiness of worship and 
thus moral perfection.
If "God" is beyond moral obligation toward humans, then it is unclear 
why one should even bother with a treatment of evil that proposes the de­
feat of horrors by the "God"-Man. We might as well just acknowledge that 
"God" (if "God" exists) is beyond moral obligation toward us, and then 
be done with the whole matter. At least, the whole effort loses its moral 
relevance given that dubious assumption. Consider how this result bears 
on Adams's universalist thesis regarding salvation of humans: "For God to 
succeed, God has to defeat horrors for everyone. . . . To be good to us, God 
will have to establish and fit us all for wholesome society" (p. 230). A natu­
ral reading of this thesis finds a moral duty of God toward humans lurking 
in the background, particularly if the thesis concerns the moral success 
and goodness of God toward humans. Even so, the thesis is misguided.
Part of God's being "good to us" includes God's not depersonalizing us by 
robbing us of our volitional agency.
Some people, including Thomas Nagel according to his published writ­
ing, do not want to live in a universe governed by God, and they have 
this striking want resolutely, after careful consideration. God would not be 
good at all in suppressing their personal agency in this regard; in fact, God 
would then be a depersonalizing tyrant. If we hold, however, that God 
has no moral obligations toward human, we will then be open to hold­
ing that God need not respect human agency or robust, freedom-based 
love among and toward humans at all. We then risk obscuring the vast 
difference between a morally perfect God worthy of worship and a dep­
ersonalizing tyrant (regardless of that tendency in various medieval and 
later Reformed theologians). That would be a horror indeed. We all need a 
straightforward conception of God that clearly defeats that horror. Other­
wise, an account of horror-defeat will seem to be a parlor game at best or, 
at worst, our alleged horror-defeater will be the worst Horror.
The apostle Paul is right in suggesting that this world has been sub­
jected to frustration and futility by God, in divine hope that people will 
enter into "the glorious freedom of the children of God" (Rom. 8:20-21). 
Even so, his God, in honoring "glorious freedom," does not rob people of 
their volitional agency. Otherwise, there would be no agents to enjoy the 
"glorious freedom" uniting the children of God. We still lack an account 
of why God's subjecting creation to futility or defeating horrors is at times 
and places so humanly painful, even crushing. If the closing chapters of the 
book of Job are on the right track, we should not hold our collective breath 
while waiting for the account. We may not be up to an account, or at least 
God may have no good purpose served by offering one to us now. Still, we 
can take some comfort in the fact that our having conclusive evidence of 
divine reality does not require our having any such account, and, in this 
horror-drenched world, we should take all the good comfort we can get.
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Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity, by 
Rick Anthony Furtak. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. 
Pp. xii + 236. $45.00 (hardback), $22.00 (paper).
ROBERT C. ROBERTS, Baylor University
This is a beautifully revised University of Chicago dissertation. If, in a 
dissertation topic, one is looking for something that connects richly with 
a current research focus (not to say craze) that is at the same time widely 
interdisciplinary, nicely matched with an interesting historical figure 
who has not yet been much exploited in that connection, and of intrinsic 
philosophical interest and human importance, it is hard to imagine being 
more successful than Rick Anthony Furtak in picking a dissertation topic. 
Emotions (even the cool and calm ones) are currently hot in academic 
life, and Soren Kierkegaard has much to say about them that is deep and 
interesting and not found elsewhere.
